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   I	  have	  always	  found	  the	  central	  drama	  in	  the	  activity	  of	  dance	  making	  to	  be	  the	  futility	  of	  solidifying	  something.	  It’s	  like	  setting	  up	  a	  house	  of	  cards	  in	  a	  hurricane	  and	  then	  walking	  ten	  feet	  back	  to	  get	  a	  better	  look	  only	  to	  find	  it	  is	  gone.	  	   Tere	  O’Connor1	  
	  
—INTRODUCTION ‘Practice-­‐as-­‐research’	   is	   now	   an	   accepted	   mode	   of	   participation	   in	   university	  postgraduate	  culture	  but	  debate	  over	  the	  precise	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  continues.	  So	  do	   questions	   around	   how	   it	   might	   challenge	   or	   confirm	   traditional	   academic,	  methodological,	   presentational	   and	   examination	   procedures.2	   The	   concept	   of	  ‘practice-­‐as-­‐research’	   does	   not	   necessarily	   suggest	   that	   practice	   is	   research.	   The	  term	  might	  point	  to	  approaches	  and	  activities	  potentially	  embraced	  by	  the	  academy,	  which	  are	  nevertheless	  heterogeneous	   to	   it	  and	   to	  conventional	  understandings	  of	  research.	   I	   take	   up	   the	   question	   of	   contemporary	   dance	   practice-­‐as-­‐research	   by	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asking	  not	  ‘what	  or	  how	  is	  this	  research?’	  but	  ‘what	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  really	  practise?’	  My	  discussion	  may	  appear	  somewhat	  wandering	  at	   times,	  but	   it	  embodies	  values	   I	  am	  seeking	  to	  make	  tangible.	  Dance	   is	   not	   your	   typical	   university	   discipline.	   It	   is	   one	   of	   those	   things	   that,	  historically,	   universities	   have	   been	   defined	   by	   excluding.	   Nonetheless,	   at	   the	  beginning	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  concurrent	  with	  the	  invention	  of	  modern	  dance,	  dance	   gained	   a	   presence	   in	   tertiary	   education	   first	   in	   the	   United	   States,	   then	   in	  England	  (primarily	  when	  Rudolf	  Laban	  and	  his	  followers	  fled	  there	  from	  Germany)	  and	  subsequently	  in	  Australia.3	  Dance	  in	  Anglophone	  institutions	  of	  higher	  learning	  has,	   however,	   been	  present	   as	   physical	   or	   vocational	   education	   (including	   teacher	  training)	  rather	   than	  as	  a	   ‘thought’	  among	  the	  wider	  scope	  of	   the	  humanities.4	  For	  dance	  artists,	  the	  outsider	  status	  of	  dance	  in	  the	  academy	  was	  not	  necessarily	  to	  be	  deplored.	   Elizabeth	  Dempster	   has	   argued,	   discussing	   her	   experience	   in	   Australian	  tertiary	   institutions	   in	   the	   late	   1970s	   and	   early	   1980s,	   that	   there	  was	   ‘power	   and	  authority,	  however	  constrained	  and	  transient’,	   in	  this	  position.5	  In	  some	  Australian	  universities	   during	   the	   1970s	   and	   1980s,	   interest	   in	   dance	   grew	   when	   cultural	  studies,	  philosophy	  and	  other	  scholars	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  poststructuralist	   ‘turn’	  to	   the	  body.6	  Then,	   in	   the	   late	  1980s,	   following	   the	  Dawkins	  reforms,	   ‘many	  dance	  and	   performing	   arts	   programs	   and	   courses	   offered	   in	   Australian	   colleges	   and	  institutes	  of	   technology	  were	  propelled	   into	  new	  university	   environments’	   and,	   as	  Dempster	   has	   noted,	   the	   ‘pressure	   was	   on	   to	   create	   a	   research	   culture,	   where	  perhaps	  none	  had	  existed	  before.’7	  I’m	   still	   not	   convinced	   that	   the	   university	   is	   where	   dancers	   belong.	   But	   I	   do	  sympathise	  with	  some	  dancers’	  hopes	  that	  the	  university	  might	  provide	  them	  with	  the	   kind	   of	   critically	   oriented,	   process-­‐friendly	   environment	   that	   is	   lacking	   in	   the	  now	   largely	   entertainment-­‐oriented	   performing	   arts	   sector.	   Some	   dancers	   have	  turned	   to	   universities	   for	   intellectual	   validation	   and	   a	   form	   of	   patronage.	  Throughout	   the	  country	  at	  any	  one	   time	  there	   is	  a	  small	  but	  significant	  number	  of	  students	  studying	  for	  a	  higher	  degree	  in	  contemporary	  dance	  practice.	  The	  arrival	  of	  practice-­‐as-­‐research,	   not	   only	   in	   contemporary	   dance	   but	   in	   all	   the	   arts,	   seems,	  paradoxically,	   to	   have	   coincided	   with	   an	   era	   of	   increased	   instrumentalisation	   of	  university-­‐based	   learning	   and	   research.	   With	   its	   audit	   culture	   and	   relentless	  demands	   for	   ever	   more	   narrowly	   defined	   research	   products,8	   the	   contemporary,	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expanded	  ‘knowledge	  economy’	  now	  comprises	  an	  undisguised	  fusion	  of	  education	  with	  capitalism.9	  	  Setting	   aside	  well-­‐justified	   complaints	   about	   the	   current	   dominant	  models	   of	  higher	   learning,	   I	   return	   to	   the	   question	   of	   dance	   practices	   having	   a	   broader	  resonance	   and	   relevance	   than	   simply	   among	   dancers—though	   I	   certainly	   do	   not	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  anything	  particularly	  or	  potentially	  redemptive	  about	  ‘dance’,	  dancing	  or	  contemporary	  dance	  culture.	  My	  discussion	  here	  is	  aspirational,	  as	  much	  for	  dance	  practices	  as	  for	  how	  any	  work	  is	  undertaken	  in	  universities	  more	  generally.	  	  
—DRILL Walter	   Benjamin	   made	   a	   distinction	   between	   ‘drill’	   and	   practice.	   Quoting	   Marx,	  Benjamin	  observed,	  ‘In	  working	  with	  machines,	  “workers	  learn	  to	  co-­‐ordinate	  their	  own	  movements	  to	  the	  uniform	  and	  unceasing	  motion	  of	  an	  automaton”’.10	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  argue:	  	  Drill	   must	   be	   differentiated	   from	   practice.	   Practice,	   which	   was	   the	   sole	  determinant	   in	  craftsmanship,	  still	  had	  a	   function	   in	  manufacturing.	  With	  it	   as	   the	   basis,	   each	   particular	   area	   of	   production	   finds	   its	   appropriate	  technical	  form	  in	  experience	  and	  slowly	  perfects	  it.11	  [my	  italics]	  We	  might	  ask,	  to	  what	  extent	  is	  the	  academic	  setting	  becoming	  the	  site	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  drill?	  In	  the	  present	  administratively	  ruled	  university	  the	  merely	  reactive	  condition	  suggested	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  drill	  is	  one	  felt	  by	  many	  academics	  as	  they	  confront	  their	  computer	  screens	  on	  which	  demands	  and	  decisions	  appear	  suddenly,	  endlessly	  and	  arbitrarily.12	  It	  may	  seem	  ironic	  to	  pose	  the	  question	  of	  drill	  as	  a	  dancer;	  that	  is,	  as	  one	  who	  figures	  in	  the	  popular	  imagination	  as	  the	  very	  product	  of	  drill.	  But	  modern	  dance	  was	  predicated	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  discovering	  new,	  sometimes	  subversive,	  bodies,	   not	   on	   mimetically	   reproducing	   the	   dominant	   social	   body	   in	   any	   of	   its	  instituted	  ‘styles’,	  And,	  insofar	  as	  drill—which	  implies	  a	  lack	  of	  agency	  instituted	  at	  the	   level	  of	   gesture—concerns	   space,	   time	  and	   the	  body,	   a	  dance	  practice	  point	  of	  view	  can	  provide	  valuable	  perspectives	  on	  these	  basic	  ingredients	  of	  work.	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—PRACTICE Practising	   has	   to	   do	   with	   attention	   to	   how	   we	   go	   about	   things,	   in	   a	   bodily	   or	  aesthetic	  sense—where	  aesthetics	  refers	   to	  our	   lives	  as	   they	  are	   lived	   in	  a	  sensate	  way.13	  In	  his	  book	  Art	  as	  Experience,	  John	  Dewey	  invoked	  practices	  when	  he	  argued	  that	  understanding	  art	  was	  made	  difficult	  by	  the	  fact	  that	   in	   ‘official’	  or	  theoretical	  explanation,	   ‘the	  art	  work’,	   the	  created	  object,	   tended	  to	  become	  isolated	  from	  ‘the	  human	   conditions	   under	   which	   it	   was	   brought	   into	   being	   and	   from	   the	   human	  consequences	  it	  engenders	  in	  actual	  life	  experience’.14	  Susan	  Melrose	  echoes	  Dewey	  when	  she	  argues	  that,	  while	  an	  (expert-­‐academic)	  spectator	  might	  regard	  a	  work	  as	  ‘the	  thing	  itself’,	  for	  a	  practitioner,	  the	  production	  or	  the	  work	  might	  be	  momentary,	  incomplete,	  and	  ‘non-­‐identical	  with	  her	  own	  larger	  epistemic	  enquiry’.15	  Dewey	  and	  Melrose	  allude	  here	  to	  the	  difficulty	  of	  making	  the	  actual	  practice	  of	  art	  count—and	  count	  in	  language.	  When	  practices	  defy	  wording	  they	  tend	  to	  disappear	  from	  view	  or	  get	  lost	  in	  translation	  to	  more	  stable	  and	  dominant	  symbolic	  systems.	  	  Practices	  involve	  doing	  things,	  often	  without	  any	  intention	  of	  getting	  results,	  if	  results	   are	   evidence	   of	   things	   that	   already	  have	   a	   name.	   This	   openness	   inheres	   in	  ‘the	   live’,	   the	   corporeal,	   the	   somatic	   aspects	   of	   practices.	   Despite	   the	   notorious	  habituality	   of	   our	   bodies	   (and	   the	   industrial	   metaphors	   that	   are	   often	   applied	   to	  them)	  we	  tend	  to	  never	  do	  things	  the	  same	  way	  twice,	  which	  was	  why	  the	   ‘human	  machine’	  on	  the	  assembly	  line	  was	  such	  an	  untoward	  phenomenon.	  The	  demand	  for	  validation	   through	   explanation	   and	   definition,	   the	   reduction	   of	   everything	   to	   (a)	  representation,	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  values	  in	  the	  not-­‐yet-­‐defined	  condition	  of	  practising.	  	  One	  somatic	  practice	  which	  has	  been	  an	  important	  resource	  informing	  work	  in	  the	  field	  of	  contemporary	  dance	  is	  the	  Alexander	  Technique.	  Reading	  Frank	  Jones’s	  book	  on	  Alexander	  and	  his	  work	  recently,	  I	  was	  struck	  by	  the	  author’s	  observation	  that:	  the	   non-­‐verbal	   aspect	   of	   [Alexander’s]	   technique	   has	   always	   been	   a	  stumbling	   block	   to	   readers	   [of	   Alexander’s	   books]	   who	   felt	   that	   he	   was	  
holding	  something	  back	  from	  them	  and	  that	  there	  was	  more	  there	  than	  the	  
books	  conveyed.16	  [my	  italics]	  Jones	   goes	   on	   to	   say	   that	   Dewey,	   Aldous	   Huxley	   and	   other	   early	   advocates	   of	  Alexander’s	   work	   ‘were	   frustrated	   in	   (their)	   attempts	   to	   describe	   the	   technique	  because	   they	   could	   not	   convey	   the	   sensory	   experiences	   it	   involved’.17	   In	   other	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words,	  it	  was	  difficult	  for	  professional	  thinkers	  and	  writers	  to	  convey	  their	  sensory	  experiences	   in	   language.	   The	   comments	   about	   ‘holding	   something	   back’,	   however,	  also	  suggest	  that	  readers	  had	  difficulty	  even	  in	  conceptualising	  that	  it	  might	  actually	  be	  necessary	  to	  do	  the	  Alexander	  work.	  Readers	  seemed	  to	  think	  that	  it	  might	  all	  be	  understood	  at	  the	  level	  of	  explanation	  alone.	  	  Academic	   research,	   particularly	   in	   the	   humanities,	   is	   also	   dedicated	   to	   the	  language	   explanation	   of	   things.	   It	   is	   also	   meant	   to	   be	   ‘applied’	   to	   effect	   positive	  change	   in	   the	   world	   beyond	   academia	   (if	   it	   is	   not	   the	   increasingly	   rare	   ‘pure’	  variety).	   However,	   ‘professional	   university-­‐related	   research’	   (to	   use	   Chakrabarty’s	  phrase)	  tends	  to	  come	  out	  of	  processes	  that	  are	  denigratory	  of	  bodily	  life—unless	  it	  can	  be	  made	  scientific	  or	  anthropological—and	  which	  thus	  deny	  an	  important	  kind	  of	   agency.18	   Academics	   rarely	   undertake	   what	   might	   be	   called	   the	   ‘extratextual	  work’	  or	  the	  ‘aesthetic	  listening’	  that	  could	  prove	  critical	  to	  their	  practices	  of	  reading	  and	  writing.19	  They	  can	  be	  appalled,	  for	  example,	  at	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘rolling	  on	  a	  ball’,	  as	  one	  colleague	  put	  it.20	  What	  academics	  (including	  those	  in	  the	  health	  sciences)	  do	  in	  their	   jobs—‘perceive,	   analyse,	   read	   and	   produce	   oral,	   written	   and	   silent	  discourses’—is	   not	   even	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   bodily	   activity.21	   In	   universities,	  knowledge	   is	   defined	   and	   constituted	   through	   a	   selective	   inattention	   to	   bodily	  sensation	   and	   by	   apparently	   excluding	   aspects	   of	   experience	   that	   are,	   in	  consequence,	   deemed	   too	   private,	   personal	   or	   interpersonal.	   Going	   back	   to	   the	  dissatisfied	  readers	  of	  Alexander’s	  books,	  they	  seemed	  to	  want	  the	  perceived	  ‘gap’	  in	  the	   book	   to	   be	   resolved	   by	   explanation.	   They	  wanted	   the	   language	   of	   the	   book	   to	  refer	  to	  body	  experiences	  and	  sensations	  or	  to	  have	  reference	  points	  that	  they	  had	  already	   excluded	   from	   their	   horizons	   of	   potential	   understanding.	   They	   reduced	  Alexander’s	  work	  to	  a	  ‘moral	  or	  textual	  problem’.22	  	  As	  a	  dancer	  and	  as	  someone	  involved	  in	  dance	  teaching	  and	  ‘higher	  degree	  by	  research’	   supervision,	   I	   am	   interested	   in	   doing	   and	   experiencing	   as	  well	   as	   in	   the	  poetic,	   transformative	   potential	   in	   both	   of	   these.	   I	   am	  working	   in	   a	   tradition	   that	  dates	   back	   to	   Isadora	   Duncan	   at	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century.	   Duncan	   was	  important	  because	  she	  found	  a	  way	  to	  move—and	  to	  present	  or	  stage	  that	  moving—that	   apparently	   encouraged	   watchers	   to	   feel	   something	   in	   their	   own	   bodies,	  something	   like	   shifts	   of	  weight.	   Duncan	   apparently	  made	   available	   or	   sensible	   the	  experience	   of	   incarnate	   ‘initiative’.	   She	   conveyed	   both	   an	   authorship	   of	   and	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authority	   in	   her	   own	   experience.	   Her’s	   and	   others’	   interest	   in	   kinaesthetics	   was	  related	   to,	   but	   different	   from,	   a	   turn-­‐of-­‐the-­‐century	   fascination	   with	   speed,	  mechanics	   and	   kinetics,	   and	   was	   a	   development	   concurrent	   with	   the	   rise	   of	  dehumanising	  ‘drill’.	  Duncan’s	  approach	  to	  dance	  emerged	  in	  part	  from	  her	  reading	  of	  Nietzsche	  to	  whom	   she	   referred	   frequently	   in	   her	   talks	   and	   writings.23	   She	   was	   interested	   in	  communicating	  via	  the	  doing	  aspect	  of	  her	  dance	  rather	  than	  through	  its	  conceptual	  meaning	  or	  in	  what	  it	  could	  represent	  in	  a	  literary	  or	  psychological	  way.	  Duncan	  saw	  her	   dancing	   as	   a	   means	   to	   enable	   an	   audience	   to	   connect	   with	   their	   own	  transformative,	   creative	  or	  destructive	  energies.	   She	  claimed	   to	  be	  always	  dancing	  the	   chorus,	   that	   component	   of	   Attic	   tragedy	   that	   enabled	   an	   audience	   to	   connect	  viscerally	  with	  the	  forces	  within	  themselves,	  not	  just	  with	  the	  moral	  of	  the	  story.	  For	  Duncan,	  dancing:	  provides	  a	  visceral,	  visual	   link	  such	   that	  spectators	  are	  able	   to	  know	  and	  affirm	   for	   themselves	   that	   ‘it	   is	   only	   as	   an	   aesthetic	   phenomenon	   that	  existence	  and	  the	  world	  are	  eternally	  justified’.24	  Such	  a	   link	  can	  only	  be	   forged	  by	  doing.	  Dancer	  Steve	  Paxton	  has	  pointed	  out	  how	  banal	   and	   attenuated	   a	   verbal	   instruction	   can	   be	   compared	   with	   the	   moving	  experiences	  to	  which	  it	  can	  give	  rise.	   ‘Walk	  in	  a	  straight	   line’,	  he	  says,	  seems	  like	  a	  simple	   invitation	   until	   some	   dancers	   begin	   to	   explore	   what	   it	   means	   for	   them	   in	  
practice,	  when	  they	  discover	  in	  it	  a	  ‘goldmine’	  or	  use	  it	  as	  a	  ‘juicy	  word-­‐game	  to	  be	  resolved	  with	  action’.25	  Language	  might	  be	  used	  to	  explain	  non-­‐verbal	  phenomena,	  but	  dances	  do	  not	  explain	  or	  are	  not	   representations	  of	   the	  verbal	   statements	  and	  naming	   that	  might	  be	  used	   temporarily	  or	  provisionally	   in	  dance	  or	  other	   somatic	  practices.	   Instead	  dance	  can	  explode	  and	  animate	   terms	  and	  concepts	  because	   the	  corporeal	  context	  through	  which	  these	  are	  mobilised	  is	  a	  dynamic	  and	  unstable	  one,	  a	  house	  of	  cards	  in	  a	  gust	  of	  wind.	  
—SPACE OF PLAY Clearly	  practice-­‐as-­‐researchers	  need	  to	  communicate	  in	  language	  across	  the	  broader	  constituency	   of	   the	   university.	   But,	   if	   there	   is	   a	   dearth	   of	   shared	   experiential,	  embodied	   reference	   points,	   there	   is	   also	   no	   ready-­‐to-­‐hand,	   widely	   accepted	  professional	   or	   disciplinary	   dance	   discourse.	   Verbalising	   about	   dance	   is	   by	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definition	   interdisciplinary.	   But	   the	   question	   of	   the	   symbolics	   with	   which	   dance	  might	  be	  spoken	  is	  still	  critical.	  How	  is	  a	  dancer’s	  interest	  in	  our	  activity,	  in	  how	  we	  go	   about	   things,	   coping	  with	   gravity	   and	   so	  on,	   to	   be	   articulated?	   In	   the	   academy,	  each	   discipline	   has	   specialised	   and	   professionalised	   languages	   and	   canonical	  reference	  points.	  So,	  potentially,	  does	  the	  art	  of	  modern	  dance.26	  But	  dance	  is	  always	  to	  some	  extent	  about	  the	  immediacy	  and	  intimacy	  of	  corporeal	  experiences	  and,	  as	  Tere	  O’Connor	  has	  put	  it,	  ‘what	  I	  know	  is	  in	  a	  state	  of	  flux—forever’.27	  Here	  we	  run	  up	   against	   a	   problem	   of	  what	   can	   be	   admitted	   into	   professional	   thought	   and	   into	  research.	  In	  dance	  practice	  everything	  that	  ‘happens’,	  since	  it	  happens	  through	  and	  to	   our	   bodies,	   counts	   and	   is	   worthy	   of	   consideration.	   To	   give	   an	   example:	   I	   was	  recently	  a	  member	  of	  a	  committee	  of	  ‘stakeholders’	  convened	  around	  the	  building	  of	  a	   new	   dance	   studio	   at	   Deakin	   University.	   The	   existing	   studio	   has	  what	   is	   called	   a	  ‘Tarkett’	  floor,	  made	  from	  vinyl.	  Tarkett	  has	  made	  a	  difference	  to	  dance	  performance	  internationally.	  It	  provides	  consistency	  for	  dancers	  who	  often	  perform	  in	  a	  range	  of	  venues,	   potentially	   on	   different	   dancing	   surfaces.	   Tarketts	   are	   transportable,	  durable	  and	  easily	  washable	  and	  they	  make	  at	  least	  one	  part	  of	  the	  performing	  and	  rehearsal	   environment	   predictable	   for	   the	   dancers.	   A	   Tarkett	   is	   a	   rational	   and	  professional	   dance	   instrument	   supporting	   the	   circulation	   of	   dance	   products.	   But	  although	  an	  efficient	  technical	  solution,	  what	  might	  be	  its	  cost	  in	  terms	  of	  potential	  poetic	  transformations	  and	  not-­‐yet-­‐defined	  practising?	  	  In	  initial	  discussions	  about	  the	  new	  studio	  I	  perceived	  that	  the	  Tarkett	  flooring	  option	   was	   very	   easily	   in	   danger	   of	   prevailing.	   I	   became	   interested	   in	   how	   the	  distinction	  between	  the	  sensations	  of	  touching	  one	  kind	  of	  surface	  or	  another—the	  dancers’	   relationship	   with	   the	   dance	   surface—might	   be	   raised	   and	   discussed	   as	  having	  persuasive	  force,	  rather	  than	  be	  seen	  as	  just	  a	  personal	  preference	  or	  a	  kind	  of	  lifestyle	  issue.	  Given	  the	  rationality	  of	  the	  Tarkett	  solution	  in	  ‘performance’	  terms,	  I	   wondered	   how	   the	   question	   of	   the	   dance	   floor	   surface	  might	   be	   kept	   open	   and	  alive.	   (The	   need	   for	   a	   ‘spring’	   in	   the	   floor	   to	   prevent	   injury	  was	   not	   in	   question.)	  Initially,	  many	   statements	  were	  made	  about	   the	  new	  studio	   floor	  but	   they	  did	  not	  originate	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   ‘experience	   and	   slowly’.	   From	   the	   institution’s	  point	   of	   view,	   a	   dance	   floor	   is	   a	   technical	  matter,	   taken	   as	   the	  passive	   context	   for	  dance,	  but	  for	  dancers	  it	  can	  be	  creatively	  active.	  It	  can	  be	  what	  Karin	  Knorr	  Cetina	  calls	  an	  ‘epistemic	  object’.28	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I	   understand	   the	   dance	   floor	   as	   akin	   to	   a	   ‘transitional	   object’,	   as	   Winnicott	  conceives	  it:	  where	  the	  transitional	  object	  or	  phenomenon	  (for	  the	  emphasis	  is	  not	  on	  the	  object	  itself	  but	  on	  what	  it	  allows	  or	  makes	  possible)	  is	  the	  valuable	  site	  of	  a	  paradox.29	  For	  Winnicott,	  the	  paradox	  of	  the	  transitional	  object	  must	  be	  allowed	  to	  exist	  and	  should	  not	  be	  explained	  away.30	  We	  have	  Winnicott	  to	  thank	  for	  not	  taking	  for	   granted	   the	   minutiae	   of	   the	   way	   babies	   and	   children	   behave.	   His	   concept	   of	  transitional	   phenomena	   came	   out	   of	   his	   observations	   of	   the	   way	   an	   infant,	   while	  sucking	   its	   thumb	  or	  going	   to	   sleep,	  will	   also	  brush	   its	  own	  cheek	  or	   fiddle	  with	  a	  lock	   of	   hair.	   For	   the	   child,	   their	   own	   body,	   their	   blanket,	   tuft	   of	   felt	   or	   other	   soft	  material,	  or	  another	  person,	   is	  both	  a	  product	  of	  their	   imagination	  and	  exists	   in	   its	  own	  right:	   it	   is	  both	   ‘me	  and	  not	  me’.	  Winnicott	  observes	   that	   the	  woven,	  hairy	  or	  furry	   texture	  of	   the	  material	  or	  object—its	  sensuous	  qualities—play	  a	  role	  here	  as	  providing	   a	   kind	   of	   resistance	   to	   the	   child’s	   fantasy.31	   When	   a	   child	   is	   using	   a	  transitional	  object	  and	  subjecting	  the	  object	   to	   its	  will,	   the	  object	   is	  not	  used	  up.	   It	  (frustratingly	   for	   the	   child)	   survives	   the	   child’s	   abuses	   and	   thus,	   Winnicott	   says,	  survives	  as	  the	  core	  of	  experience.	  This	  dynamic	  co-­‐existence	  of	  different	   ‘realities’	  in	  the	  object	  constitutes	  the	  very	  ground	  of	  experience	  for	  the	  child	  and	  becomes	  a	  place	   for	   ‘creatively	   living’.32	   Explanation,	   or	   what	   Winnicott	   calls	   ‘split-­‐off	  intellectual	  functioning’,	  can	  resolve	  the	  paradox	  of	  the	  transitional	  object	  but	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  value	  of	  the	  paradox	  itself,	  which	  is	  the	  value	  of	  ‘the	  intermediate	  area	  of	  experiencing’.33	   Socially	   and	   culturally	   speaking,	   the	   value	   of	   this	   paradox	   is	   the	  value	   of	   a	   ‘space	   of	   play’,	   a	   between-­‐space	   of	   risk,	   resistance,	   survival	   and	  destruction/creation.34	  The	  space	  of	  play	  is	  a	  relational	  space	  in	  which	  objects	  are,	  to	  use	  Knorr	  Cetina’s	  term	  again,	  ‘epistemic’	  and	  ‘defined	  by	  their	  lack	  of	  completeness	  of	  being	  and	  their	  non-­‐identity	  with	  themselves’.35	  Unlike	  the	  purpose-­‐built	  or	  ready-­‐made	  Tarkett,	  it	  could	  be	  said	  that	  a	  polished	  wooden	  floor	  is	  not	  just	  a	  surface	  for	  cultural	  projections	  of	  a	  dance	  already	  spoken	  for.	  A	  wooden	  floor	  can	  suggest	  possibilities	  through	  its	  texture	  or	  grain,	   its	  sheen,	  its	  evoked	  ‘carpentry’	  qualities	  and	  so	  on.	  A	  wooden	  floor	  has	  an	  existence	  of	  its	  own	  in	   addition	   to	   and	   in	   excess	   of	   its	   being	   simply	   or	   explicitly	   for	   dance.	   A	  wooden	  surface	  is	  not	  ‘exactly	  right’	  for	  dance	  because	  we	  do	  not	  yet	  know	  what	  that	  dance	  might	  be.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  qualities	  or	  attributes	  of	  a	  wooden	  floor	  are	  not	  used	  up	   in	   use.	  The	   floor	   is	   not	   ‘consumed	  by	   the	  moment	   of	   action’.36	   This	   is	   a	   phrase	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Adorno	   used	  when	   he	   reflected	   upon	   the	   different	   experiences	   and	   techniques	   of	  opening	  and	  closing	  doors	  and	  windows	  with	  different	  kinds	  of	  handles	  and	  latches,	  showing	   how	   such	  minor,	   domestic	   activities	   and	   relationships	   with	   things	   could	  contain	  much	  that	  is	  political.	  A	  wooden	  floor,	  I	  propose,	  can	  ‘survive	  as	  the	  core	  of	  experience’:	  it	  can	  be	  an	  instrument	  or	  equipment	  for	  a	  dancer	  as	  well	  as	  possessing	  its	   own	   independent	  qualities	   that	   exceed	  or	   resist	   being	  merely	   an	   instrument.	  A	  wooden	  floor	  can	  provide	  resistance	  to	  a	  pre-­‐constituted	  or	  institutionalised	  dance	  fantasy.	  	  My	  attempt	  here	  to	  find	  concepts	  that	  link	  the	  here	  and	  now	  practicalities	  and	  ‘everything-­‐ness’	  of	  dance	  to	  wider	  concerns,	  and	  thus	  to	  theorise	  the	  relevance	  of	  having	  a	  discussion	  about	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  dance	  floor,	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  actually	  rolling	  or	  balancing	  on	  that	  floor.	  But	  rolling	  for	  a	  dancer	  is	  also	  a	  form	  of	  thinking	  and	   questioning	   that	   can	   lead	   to	   discovering	   and	   creating	   concepts.	   It	   is	   just	   that	  nothing	  stays	  still	  or	   the	  same	   long	  enough	   to	  solidify.	  The	   important	   thing	   is	   that	  there	   is	   not	   really	   a	   short	   cut	   to	   thinking	   relevant	   to	   dancing.	   You	   have	   to	   be	  implicated	  in	  it.	  A	  space	  of	  play	  needs	  to	  be	  created	  in	  which	  private	  sensations	  and	  shareable	   concepts	   are	   transformed	   through	   each	   other.	   The	   body	   is	   its	   own	  transitional	  object:	  the	  concept	  of	   ‘body-­‐image’	  as	  the	  factual	  and	  imaginary	  body’s	  relation	  to	  and	  use	  of	  itself	  testifies	  to	  this.37	  	  
—APPEARING If	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  dance	  floor	  in	  the	  context	  of	  academia	  is	  broadly	  one	  of	  a	  space	  of	  play,	   there	   is	   also	   the	  question	  of	   time.	  Winnicott’s	   notion	  of	   ‘intensely	   living’	   is	   a	  particular	   species	   of	   time.	   Dance	   practice—located	   within	   a	   dancer’s	   body—requires	  an	  apparently	  empty	  time,	  a	  time	  of	  the	   ‘pre-­‐movement’	  during	  which	  the	  as	   yet	   invisible	   movement-­‐to-­‐come	   can	   become	   poetically	   charged.	   This	   is	   the	  ‘gestural	   anacrusis’:	   a	   pause	   in	  which	   the	   deciding	  mind	   is	   emptied	   out	   and	   one’s	  body	   lets	   go.38	   This	   kind	   of	   empty	   time	   zone	   is	   necessary	   more	   than	   just	   in	   the	  preparation	  of	  individual	  moves.	  Any	  creative	  process	  requires	  fallow	  times.	  Driving	  through	  Slovenia	  in	  mid-­‐winter,	  the	  houses	  and	  fields	  are	  quite	  immobile	  except	  for	  the	  snow	  falling	  in	  its	  accentless	  way.	  Aside	  from	  a	  few	  passing	  cars,	  no	  one	  is	  visible	  in	  the	  countryside.	  I	  imagine	  that	  the	  local	  inhabitants	  know	  to	  wait	  patiently	  during	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this	  time	  of	  invisible	  germination.	  It	  is	  the	  critical	  time	  of	  pause	  in	  which	  the	  spring	  is	  being	  prepared.	  	  Dance	   provides,	   potentially	   at	   least,	   a	   structure	   for	   thinking	   temporally.	  Whereas	  linguistic	  and	  intellectual	  functions	  tend	  to	  ‘operate	  on	  what	  might	  happen,	  or	  on	  what	  did	  happen’,	  in	  dance	  the	  challenge	  is	  to	  bring	  the	  passage	  of	  time	  and	  of	  change	   through	   time	   into	   awareness	   as	   it	   is	   happening.39	   The	   Greek	   concept	   of	  ‘kairos’	  is	  useful	  here:	  ‘kairos	  is	  the	  present	  moment	  as	  it	  unfolds	  during	  a	  stretch	  of	  awareness,	   or	   the	   passing	   moment	   in	   which	   something	   happens	   as	   the	   time	  unfolds’.40	  The	  performer’s	  presence	  comes	  at	  least	  in	  part	  from	  a	  practice	  of	  being	  present	   in	   the	   instant.	   But	   dance	   goes	   further	   than	   this	   to	  make	   time	   a	  matter	   or	  material	   that	   is	  worked.41	   In	  practices	   that	  draw	  on	   the	   tradition	  of	  modern	  dance	  with	   its	   independence	   from	  music,	   time	   is	   ‘compressed,	   dilated,	   produced	   by	   the	  deliberate	   choices	   of	   a	   subject	   who	   invents’,	   but	   also	   by	   the	   body	   itself	   which	   ‘is	  what	  it	  can	  do	  as	  it	  goes	  along	  …	  defined	  by	  the	  constantly	  shifting	  and	  transforming	  capacities	  it	  carries	  with	  it	  from	  step	  to	  step’.42,	  This	  kind	  of	  working	  with	  time	  is	  not	  recognised	   in	   university	   regimes	   of	   increasingly	   instrumentalised	   or	   externally	  measured	  time,	  or	  in	  the	  time	  of	  drill.	  The	  way	  we	  go	  about	   things	  practically,	   the	  way,	  when	  we	  are	  producing,	  we	  are	  also	  living,	  has	  little	  value	  in	  academic	  research	  paradigms.	  Questioning	  how	  we	  go	   about	   things	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   intimacy	   and	   potential	   creativity	   of	   everyday	  experiencing	  is	  not	  encouraged:	  it	  is	  deemed	  as	  belonging	  to	  the	  so-­‐called	  private	  or	  personal	   realm,	   not	   to	   the	   official	   realm	  or	   to	   any	   research	   that	  might	   be	  publicly	  funded.	   This	   ideological	   separation	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   public	   and	   private	   aspects	   of	  existence,	  of	  micro-­‐experiences,	  sensations	  and	  perceptions	  from	  publicly	  validated	  products,	  is	  a	  way	  of	  resolving	  a	  paradox	  that	  forecloses	  on	  creative	  and	  potentially	  subversive	   possibilities.	   Doings	   are	   tolerated	   for	  what	   they	   produce,	   not	   for	   their	  being	  the	  basis	  of	  experiencing	  or	  ‘intensely	  living’.	  	  To	   take	   this	   question	   about	   the	   place	   of	   practices	   in	   academia	   a	   step	   further	  towards	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘praxis’	   I	  will	   turn	   to	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  who	   in	   her	   book	  The	  
Human	   Condition	   (1958)	   proposes	   ‘to	   think	   what	   we	   are	   doing’.43	   She	   uses	   the	  concept	  of	  ‘natality’	  to	  elaborate	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  human	  ‘appearing’;	  that	  is,	  how	  each	  individual,	  subsequent	  to	  her	  or	  his	  biological	  birth,	  comes	  to	  appear	  in	  public	  through	   acting.	   Individuals	   become	   agents,	   able,	   not	   just	   to	   repeat	   mechanically	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what	  others	  have	  done	  before	  them	  but,	  among	  others,	  to	  begin	  something	  anew	  ‘on	  our	  own	  initiative’.44	  Action	  or	  acting	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  intransitive,	  not	  instrumental.	  It	  is	  a	  ‘second	  birth,	  in	  which	  we	  confirm	  and	  take	  upon	  ourselves	  the	  naked	  fact	  of	  our	  original	  physical	  appearance’.45	  Acting	  can	  be	  related	  to	  the	  quasi-­‐biological	  idea	  of	  an	   ‘organism’s	   urge	   to	   make	   itself	   known’—an	   idea	   that	   the	   movement	   theorist	  Rudolf	  Laban	  invoked	  in	  what	  has	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  ‘effort-­‐shape	  theory’	  and	  in	  which	   our	   ‘inner	   attitudes’	   to	  weight,	   space,	   time	   and	   flow	   are	   the	   dynamic	   paths	  along	  which	   each	  person	   reveals	   her/himself.46	  But	  Arendt	   is	   also	   concerned	  with	  the	   social	   and	   political	   conditions	   that	   make	   ‘appearing’	   possible	   and	   which	   a	  condition	  of	  appearing	  might	  support.	  She	  writes:	  a	  life	  spent	  entirely	  in	  public	  …	  becomes,	  as	  we	  would	  say,	  shallow.	  While	  (such	  a	  life)	  retains	  its	  visibility,	  it	  loses	  the	  quality	  of	  rising	  into	  sight	  from	  some	  darker	  ground	  which	  must	  remain	  hidden	  if	  it	  is	  not	  to	  lose	  its	  depth	  in	  a	  very	  real	  non-­‐subjective	  sense.47	  [my	  italics]	  In	  this	  passage	  Arendt	  uses	  the	  present	  participle	  to	  denote	  a	  movement	  or	  passage	  and	  a	  paradox:	  is	  something	  that	  is	  rising	  into	  sight	  visible	  or	  not?	  Arendt	  invites	  us	  to	  be	  comfortable	  with	  this	  paradox	  of	  visibility/invisibility	  and	  not	  try	  to	  resolve	  it	  with	  ‘split-­‐off	  intellectual	  functioning’.	  ‘Appearance’	  or	  action	  is	  not	  an	  epiphany,	  nor	  is	  it	  only	  ‘aligned	  with	  human	  intentionality	  or	  subjectivity.	  It	  is	  an	  enactment.’48	  	  But,	  paradoxically,	  in	  the	  objectual	  nature	  of	  our	  body-­‐selves	  we	  also	  appear	  or	  rise	   into	  sight	  as	   ‘responsive’;	  by	  being	  bodies	  we	  receive	   ‘jolts’	  and	  are	  able	   to	  be	  shifted	  or	  displaced.49	  The	  responsiveness	  we	  have	  by	  being	  bodies	  is	  what	  the	  first	  year	  of	  life	  teaches	  us	  as	  we	  are	  picked	  up,	  moved	  and	  carried	  about	  by	  others	  (and	  which	  at	  an	  extreme	  enables	  us	  to	  be	  subjected	  to	  drill).	  These	  early	  experiences	  are	  why	  dancers	   can	   feel	   that	   they	  are	  being	  gathered	  up	  and	  held	  by	   the	   floor	   at	   the	  same	  time	  as	  using	  it	  and	  being	  able	  to	  make	  an	  imprint	  upon	  it;	  and	  why	  watchers	  might	  feel	  themselves	  through	  me	  as	  I	  roll,	  along	  the	   indefinitely	  unfolding	  surface	  that	   joins	  us,	   the	  shifting	  of	  my	  weight	  also	  perhaps	   felt	  as	   the	  shifting	  of	   theirs	   in	  the	  mystery	  of	  being	  returned	  to	  their	  own	  bodies.	  	  The	   question	   of	   practice	   as	   research	   is	   not	   a	   superficial	   one.	   It	   is	   a	   way	   of	  helping	  us	  to	   ‘think	  what	  we	  are	  doing’	   in	  the	  broadest	  sense—of	  questioning	  how	  we	  are	   living	  our	   research	  and	  knowledge	  production	  processes	  and	  what	  benefit,	  implications	   and	   vision	   this	   may	   contain	   for	   lives	   as	   they	   are	   actually	   lived.	   Arts	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practices	   with	   their	   concern	   for	   experiential	   detail	   belong	   to	   that	   which	   is	   not	  ‘entirely	  in	  public’,	  to	  the	  more	  intimate,	  darker	  ground	  from	  which	  things	  can	  rise	  into	   sight	   while	   retaining	   their	   depth	   and	   real	   significance.	   Practices	   enormously	  expand	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  research	  question:	  how	  do	  we	  know	  what	  to	  look	  for?	  	  —	  Sally	   Gardner	   is	   a	   lecturer	   in	   the	   School	   of	   Communication	   and	   Creative	   Arts	   at	  Deakin	   University,	   Melbourne.	   She	   performs	   as	   an	   occasional	   guest	   artist	   with	  Russell	  Dumas’	  Dance	  Exchange,	  is	  a	  co-­‐editor	  of	  Writings	  on	  Dance	  journal	  and	  is	  a	  regular	   contributor	   to	   local	   and	   international	   arts’	   and	   humanities’	   forums	   and	  publications.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
—NOTES 1	  T.	  O’Connor,	  ‘Unviable	  Structures’,	  2010,	  <http://www.tereoconnordance.org/blog/>,	  viewed	  14	  July	  2010.	  2	  See	  E.	  Dempster,	  ‘Undisciplined	  Subjects,	  Unregulated	  Practices:	  Dancing	  in	  the	  Academy’	  in	  
Conference	  Proceedings:	  Dance	  Re-­booted,	  Initializing	  the	  Grid,	  2005,	  <www.ausdance.org.au/resources/publications/conference-­‐papers.html>;	  M.	  Phillips,	  C.	  Stock,	  K.	  Vincs,	  Dancing	  between	  Diversity	  and	  Consistency:	  Refining	  Assessment	  in	  Postgraduate	  Degrees	  in	  Dance,	  Western	  Australian	  Academy	  of	  Performing	  Arts,	  Perth,	  2009;	  PARIP	  	  (Practice	  as	  Research	  in	  Performance)	  website	  <www.bris.ac.uk/parip/>.	  3	  In	  ‘Dance	  Studies	  in	  the	  International	  Academy:	  Genealogy	  of	  a	  Disciplinary	  Formation’	  J.R.	  Giersdorf	  notes,	  ‘The	  histories	  of	  physical	  education,	  modern	  dance,	  women’s	  liberation,	  and	  the	  hygiene	  movement	  were	  important	  influences	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  three	  programs	  in	  dance	  studies’	  which	  he	  discusses.	  Dance	  Research	  Journal,	  vol.	  41,	  no.	  1,	  Summer	  2009,	  p.	  27.	  4	  Alexandra	  Carter	  writes	  in	  her	  introduction	  to	  The	  Routledge	  Dance	  Studies	  Reader,	  Routledge,	  London	  and	  New	  York,	  1998:	  ‘In	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Britain,	  dance	  found	  a	  home	  during	  the	  early	  part	  of	  the	  century	  within	  physical	  education	  departments,	  where	  it	  could	  be	  disguised	  as	  a	  form	  of	  exercise	  and	  made	  morally	  and	  educationally	  acceptable’	  (p.	  4). In	  Australia,	  dance	  was	  initially	  studied	  at tertiary	  level	  as	  part	  of	  teacher	  training	  programs,	  or	  in	  vocationally	  oriented	  performing	  arts	  colleges.	  5	  Dempster,	  ‘Undisciplined	  Subjects’.	  6	  Giersdorf	  argues	  that	  the	  use	  of	  such	  terms	  as	  ‘choreography’	  in	  fields	  beyond	  dance	  (during	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s)	  where	  they	  were	  ‘dereferentialized’	  was	  a	  symptom	  of	  ‘shifts	  in	  the	  function	  of	  the	  university	  from	  a	  nationalizing	  institution	  to	  a	  transnational	  corporation’.	  The	  role	  in	  this	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  dereferentialisation	  of	  the	  approach	  to	  dance	  studies	  taken	  at	  the	  University	  of	  California,	  Riverside,	  where	  ‘choreography’	  became	  a	  (poststructuralist)	  theoretical	  term,	  he	  argues,	  was	  part	  of	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